Junos : Multiple products affected by SSL "POODLE" vulnerability

he SSL protocol 3.0 (SSLv3) uses nondeterministic CBC padding, which makes it easier for man-in-the-middle attackers to obtain cleartext data via a padding-oracle attack.  This issue is also known as the "POODLE" vulnerability.

SSL v3 is an older security protocol with known issues, but still exists as a fallback protocol on many devices.

Vulnerable Products

• Junos OS
• Connect Secure (SA / SSL VPN) / Policy Secure (IC / UAC), MAG Series
• ScreenOS
• Junos Space
• STRM/JSA Series
• NSM (server and NSM4000, NSM3000, NSMXpress appliance)
• Standalone IDP
• Firefly Host (vGW Series)
• SBR Carrier.

Products Not Vulnerable

• JunosE
• QFabric Director
• Juniper owned web servers that provide feature support for ScreenOS and SRX (Deep Inspection (DI), AV, and licensing)

Juniper is continuing to investigate our product portfolio for affected software that is not mentioned above. As new information becomes available this document will be updated.

This issue has been assigned CVE-2014-3566.

Solution:

Junos:
OpenSSL has been upgraded to 0.9.8zc (pre-Junos OS 13.3) and 1.0.1j (Junos OS 13.3+), adding support for SSL 3.0 Fallback protection (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV).

The following software releases have been updated to resolve this specific issue: Junos OS 11.4R13, 12.1X44-D45, 12.1X46-D26, 12.1X47-D20, 12.3R9, 12.3X48-D10, 13.2R7, ​13.3R5, 14.1R4, 14.1X53-D20, 14.2R2, and all subsequent releases.


Connect Secure (SA / SSL VPN) / Policy Secure (IC / UAC), MAG Series:
Please refer to Pulse Secure TSB16540 for details on mitigating risk from this vulnerability.

ScreenOS:
PR 1033963 has been submitted to Development and to resolve this issue in a future release.

Junos Space:
Disable SSLv3 by changing the following files.

/etc/httpd/conf.d/webProxy.conf
/etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.conf
/etc/httpd/conf.d/webConf/webProxyCertAuth.conf

The following line needs to be updated to remove references to SSLv3:

Original:
SSLProtocol -ALL +SSLv3 +TLSv1

Updated:
SSLProtocol -ALL +TLSv1

Restart httpd by typing 'service httpd restart'.

A future release of Junos Space will disable SSLv3 by default.

STRM/JSA Series:
Enginering is developing a patch to resolve this issue.

NSM (server and NSM3000/NSMXpress appliance):
SSLv3 has been disabled in 2012.2R10 and all subsequent releases.

Standalone IDP:
Modify /etc/httpd/conf/httpd.conf to add -SSLv3 as below and then restart httpd ('service httpd restart').

Old: SSLProtocol all -SSLv2
New: SSLProtocol all -SSLv2 -SSLv3

Firefly Host (vGW Series):
Resolved in upcoming release 6.0R2 of Firefly Host by adding ssl.use-sslv3 = "disable" to configuration.

---

IDP Signature:
Juniper has released signature SSL:AUDIT:SSL-V3-TRAFFIC in Sigpack 2430 to detect SSLv3 traffic.

Workaround:
Junos:
Since SSL is used for remote network configuration and management applications such as J-Web and SSL Service for JUNOScript (XNM-SSL), viable workarounds for this issue in Junos may include:

• Disabling J-Web
• Disable SSL service for JUNOScript and only use Netconf, which makes use of SSH, to make configuration changes
• Limit access to J-Web and XNM-SSL from only trusted networks

On SRX Series services gateways, Junos Pulse also fetches the configuration file via HTTPS.  To guard against downgrade/SSLv3 MITM attacks, an alternative workaround may be used to disable SSLv3 negotiation:

1. From the root shell:
root@junos% vi /jail/var/etc/httpd.conf

Change the default config of "SSLProtocol ALL -SSLV2" to "SSLProtocol TLSv1"

2. Find the process ID (pid) of httpd and kill/restart it:
root@junos% ps auxw | grep httpd
root@junos% kill -9 (pid of httpd) OR kill -HUP (pid of httpd)

*Note: This change will not survive reboots.  Additionally, executing the 'restart web-management' CLI command will restart the httpd-gk process which will regenerate the default httpd.conf file, overwriting manual changes. Refer to KB18162 for more information about this workaround.


ScreenOS:
A temporary workaround for the server side of ScreenOS you can disable the HTTPS web user interface and the WebAuth feature. If you disable the HTTPS user interface you would be required to do configuration management over command line (SSH). The command to disable SSL is the following:  unset ssl enable

NSM4000, NSM3000, NSMXpress:
For Apache server listening on port 443:

Edit /etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.conf and change the SSLProtocol entry to:

SSLProtocol all -SSLv2 -SSLv3

and restart HTTPD services.

For webproxy used to download the NSM client on port 8443:

Edit the /usr/netscreen/GuiSvr/lib/webproxy/conf/server.xml

from:

clientAuth="false" sslProtocol="SSL" keystoreFile="VAR-NSROOT-VAR/GuiSvr/lib/webproxy/conf/.webproxy_keystore"

to:

clientAuth="false" sslProtocols="TLSv1,TLSv1.1,TLSv1.2" keystoreFile="VAR-NSROOT-VAR/GuiSvr/lib/webproxy/conf/.webproxy_keystore"

and resart GuiSvr.

Client Side Mitigation:

The risk of attack from negotiating or being forced to downgrade to SSLv3 can be completely mitigated by disabling SSLv3 support in the browser.

Junos: Firewall filter fails to match on port

The issue only affects routers utilizing Trio-based PFE modules running Junos OS 13.3R3, 14.1R1, and 14.1R2 

When configuring a stateless firewall filter on a system with Trio-based PFE modules (e.g. MX Series), any source or destination port matching condition may fail to match intended packets, causing the filter to not execute the actions specified in the 'then' clause.​​​​ Depending on the intent and design of the interface filter, this match failure may have unexpected impact on the router or follow-on filter clauses. For example, if traffic with a specific destination port was designed to be accepted, a later "reject all" clause may inadvertently discard wanted traffic. Conversely, if certain destination ports are meant to be dropped, malicious traffic may be consumed by the RE or forwarded on to downstream routers.

This issue only affects routers running Junos OS 13.3R3, 14.1R1, and 14.1R2. Additionally, this issue only affects IPv4 traffic. IPv6 port matching filters are unaffected by this issue.


Juniper SIRT is not aware of any malicious exploitation of this vulnerability.

No other Juniper Networks products or platforms are affected by this issue.

The following software releases have been updated to resolve this specific issue: Junos OS 13.3R3-S3​, 13.3R4, 14.1R3, 14.2R1, and all subsequent releases.

This issue is being tracked as PR 1003494 ​and is visible on the Customer Support website.

Note: While the vulnerability does not impact versions of Junos prior to 13.3R3, the actual code modified to resolve the issue existed in earlier releases. For this reason, the prsearch tool will report fixes in Junos OS 12.3R8 and 13.2R6, even though the vulnerability was never exposed in these releases.

KB16765 - "In which releases are vulnerabilities fixed?" describes which release vulnerabilities are fixed as per our End of Engineering and End of Life support policies.

Configure Chassis Cluster (High Availability) on a SRX240 device

Configure SRX240 devices as a Chassis Cluster.

The following topology will be used for the configuration:


Topology notes:  

• Both reths (reth 0.0 and reth 1.0) belong to Redundancy Group 1, the data plane. 
• Redundancy Group 0 is the control plane.
• ge-0/0/2 was selected for the fabric (data) link in this example. For the fabric link, a GE port is recommended.

JUNOS : How to block facebook website on Juniper SRX

Action Plan:
To block “http://www.face.com” for users/subnet using Juniper web-filtering and IDP configuration

Web filtering configuration:
#set security utm custom-objects url-pattern facebook value “http://www.facebook.com”
#set security utm custom-objects custom-url-category facebook value facebook
#set security utm feature-profile web-filtering url-blacklist custom-deny
#set security utm feature-profile web-filtering type juniper-local
#set security utm feature-profile web-filtering juniper-local profile local-engine default permit
#set security utm utm-policy webfiltering web-filtering http-profile local-engine For blocking https

 IDP configuration:
[edit security idp]
# set custom-attack youtube_block recommended-action close-client
# set custom-attack youtube_block severity major;
# set custom-attack youtube_block attack-type signature context ssl-cert-common-name
# set custom-attack youtube_block attack-type signature pattern “.*facebook\.com.*”
# set custom-attack youtube_block attack-type signature direction server-to-client
#set custom-attack youtube_client_block recommended-action close-client
# set custom-attack youtube_client_block severity majo
# set custom-attack youtube_client_block attack-type signature context ssl-client-hello
# set custom-attack youtube_client_block attack-type signature pattern “.*facebook\.com.*”
# set custom-attack youtube_client_block attack-type signature direction client-to-server
#set custom-attack-group yout_blck group-members [ facebook_client_block facebook_block ]
#set idp-policy youtube_blck_policy rulebase-ips rule 1 match from-zone trust to-zone untrust application junos-https attacks custom-attack-groups yout_blck
#set idp-policy youtube_blck_policy rulebase-ips rule 1 then action recommended
#set idp-policy youtube_blck_policy rulebase-ips rule 1 then notification log-attacks severity major